folder 53 - 005
examination/analysis, either a high degree of information throughout or in fact an information basis: it either will possess or be information, + when this ceases to be the case, it will cease to be true cosmos. Then the plasmate et al. simply is what true cosmos would exhibit, + the mystery is solved.
Another + vastly significant point is this: I noted that all thinking by "the mind" took the form of arrangements + rearrangements of physical objects (rather than what we presumably do when we think: our thinking is not corporeal). But this is proof that we are dealing here with cosmos + not God, because "cosmos" is the world-order strictly defined in a precise way, + not God (i.e. not incorporeal spirit separate from world order); thus my very description given in "Valis" -of brain, not mind- turns out to be in fact a description of cosmos: thoughts of necessity taking the form of arrangements + rearrangements of physical -corporeal- objects is what "kosmos" signifies when properly understood. There is no other correct term for what I saw when I saw physical thoughts in terms of changing mutual arrangements of physical objects -presumably all physical objects in the universe- than kosmos. If we saw the physical objects but not as thoughts we would have reality, universe, world, world-order, etc., + if there were incorporeal thoughts we would have God, demiurge, Logos, nous, etc. It is the necessary unity of the two that renders it kosmos. Needless to say, I did not know this when I saw it in 3-74 + (I believe) not when I wrote "Valis" if indeed I knew it at all before today. But (as I say) we must revert to -or revive, reinstate- the pre-Atomist continuum reality + go at once from that to kosmos; we can never go from discontinuous matter reality to kosmos. With the discontinuous matter model you wind up with e.g. Wittgenstein who could not discern any totality or overall structure + was (to me) a nihilist pure + simple.
Nobody has written a note for this page yet
Please sign in to write a note for this page